

three letters. And here it is a pleasure to observe that the tact in selection is admirable. Not a letter could be spared.

Perhaps the least satisfactory part of the volume is the Confederate part. Here the silences are notable. Nothing is added to what we know already of the Secession movement; no new light is thrown on the mystery of the Confederate presidential election; nor on the contentions relative to the beginning of hostilities; nor on the problems of the government. The value of this portion is chiefly in touches of character and in this respect the letters of Toombs are far the most distinctive. Unfortunately, the character revealed lacks balance. His tone too often is both querulous and cocksure. As an amateur general, he is bitterly jealous of the West Pointers. Though his quarrel with Davis is not narrated, the results of it soon appear. The President of the Confederacy becomes "that Scoundrel Jeff Davis" (December 1, 1862) and a "false and hypocritical wretch" (March 2, 1863).

However, it is in this venom over Davis that perhaps is preserved—like the traditional fly in the amber—a positive detail of Confederate history. Though the anti-Davis Georgians—Toombs, Stephens, and Joseph E. Brown—Cobb having taken the other side—are forever reassuring each other of their hatred of Davis, they never let fall any hint of co-operation with anti-Davis leaders in other states. Here is a curious bit of circumstantial evidence telling in its small way against the theory of a concerted opposition to the President.

N. W. STEPHENSON.

War Time in Manila. By Rear-Admiral BRADLEY A. FISKE, U.S.N.
(Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1913. Pp. 276.)

APPRECIATION of Admiral Fiske's narrative will depend mainly upon the form in which individual readers prefer to take their dose of history. Here is no bald official statement of facts; no trained writer's story to newspaper or magazine; no product of a painstaking historian. It is a rambling tale of personal experiences and observations, in fact, quite emphatically personal, almost as much so as Pepys's *Diary*. The writer explains this in his preface, by stating that the book is made up mainly of extracts from letters written, at the time, to his mother.

So much of the book is pleasantly readable that it seems ungracious to criticize its lack of literary construction and coherence, its evidence of limited sense of literary proportion and perspective, and its numerous petty errors in spelling and in names. It makes no real difference to the general reader, whose purpose in reading is entertainment rather than information, that the writer calls the Filipino beast of burden a "carabou" instead of a carabao, that he calls a caramata a "carametta", that he shows the Sultana of Sulu chewing "beetle" instead of betel, that in his hands Captain Dapray becomes "Dupray", or that the vessel convoyed to Siassi and Bongao was the *Bolinao* and not the "Buchuan". A considerable list of such trifling errors might be noted, but they are of no vital importance in a book of this character.

As a contribution to history, the book presents little or nothing that is new, and it deals only incidentally with some of the more important movements of the navy in Manila Bay in 1898. There are perhaps many who will regard some of the writer's opinions as rather heretical. For instance, he sees in Admiral Dewey's famous victory more indication of Spanish error of judgment than of superior American skill and valor. He says that "if the Spaniards had placed their fleet where it would have been supported by Manila's guns (the shore batteries) they would have sunk every American ship". To a similar cause he attributes the comparatively easy victory of the American troops on shore. Thus, he states that the Spanish captain-general, with 13,000 disciplined troops, "allowed 10,000 American troops to land in open barges, within range of his artillery, without firing a shot; and he waited until they had built good intrenchments, within a thousand yards of Fort San Antonio, before he made it at all inconvenient for them". He reaches the conclusion, in which many military and naval men will concur, that if military power depended upon guns and fortifications and ships alone, "Manila would not have been taken, and the little American fleet would have been disastrously repulsed".

But the book is, on the whole, decidedly readable, and that appears to be its principal purpose. It gives the reader little glimpses of life aboard vessels, with which few are familiar; gives little sketches of battles on shore; gives a picture of a little gunboat, and another of a clumsy monitor, in struggle with a stormy sea; and takes us into strange ports which few of us visit. Here and there, a paragraph borders on the highly dramatic, as does the description of the night march of the regiment past the Hotel Oriente, and there are, scattered throughout the pages, touches of both pathos and humor.

ALBERT G. ROBINSON.

MINOR NOTICES

Lexique de Géographie Ancienne. Par Maurice Besnier, Professeur à l'Université de Caen. Avec une Préface de R. Cagnat, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur au Collège de France. [Nouvelle Collection à l'Usage des Classes, XXX.] (Paris, C. Klincksieck, 1914, pp. xvii, 893.) This useful little volume, by a scholar already well known for such interesting books as *Les Catacombes de Rome*, hardly needed to be vouched for by Cagnat. A pendant to Goyau's *Chronologie*, it gives with succinctness (which is greater in the case of well-known places) under each place a reference to the *Atlas Antiquus* of van Kempen, its modern name, its history and development, a statement as to whether there are ruins, and finally the most important references to Greek and Latin authors, to inscriptions in the *CIG.*, *IG.*, and *CIL.*, and to Head's *Historia Numorum* for coins. At the end is a convenient table of modern names. The information exists in other larger dictionaries, like